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this were to curtail some freedom and soul making, it would be worth it. 
While process and open theism largely agree on temporalistic omniscience, 
they part company, as we have seen, with respect to divine power. 
Although appreciating divine persuasion, open theists insist upon omnipo-
tence as the norm, even if it is self-limited in most cases. Besides Hasker 
and Griffin, who debate the major differences, Rice, Howell, and Wheeler 
take up more mediating positions. 
Wheeler in particular explores what elements an evangelical can learn 
from process theism. His finely nuanced essay suggests further ways in 
which the discussion may be taken. He presents the evangelical position in 
terms of National Association of Evangelicals 1942 statement of faith (p. 
111), and explores its ramifications in terms of process theism, including 
the question of Biblical authority. He indicates other areas such as the 
Body of Christ, the earth community, and eschatology where dialogue 
could be especially fruitful. 
Finite and Infinite Goods, by Robert Adams. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. Pp. 424. $45.00 (hardcover). 
TIMOTHY CHAPPELL, Department of Philosophy, University of Dundee, 
Dundee, Scotland. t.d.j.chappell@dundee.ac.uk 
This remarkable book is a milestone in ethics and in philosophy of reli-
gion. Directly, it is the fruit of thought and reflection on ethics over at least 
ten years- from Robert Adams' Wilde Lectures in Oxford in 1989, to its 
publication in 1999. Equally but less directly, it represents, co-ordinates 
and systematises Adams' writings on ethics over the whole of the last 
quarter-century. Those who know Adams' distinguished work at the cut-
ting edge of analytical philosophy of religion will come to this book with 
high expectations. I believe they will not be disappointed. Anyone who 
thinks that there is nothing new in philosophy of religion, or that secular-
minded ethicists need know no more about theistic ethics than the 
Euthyphro Dilemma, had better think again. 
If I were requested to sum up Finite and Infinite Goods in a single sound-
bite, I think the sound-bite would have to be "generosity of intellect and 
imagination". One of Adams' chief gifts is his Bach-like ability to take a 
simple theme and show how much can be done with it: how widely and 
how differently different variations on that theme can be applied and reap-
plied. It is this intellectual generosity and imagination that holds together 
what would otherwise be an unwieldy and inchoate variety collection. The 
book is vast in. its ambition and its scope, covering everything from the 
semantics and metaphysics of value to eros, idolatry and martyrdom. It is 
only Adams' exceptional ability to keep a grip on his "big picture" that 
enables him to tell a coherent story about so many different regions of our 
life and thought. 
The book is divided into four sections. Part I, "The Nature of the Good," 
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contends that the goodness of any finite good consists in its resemblance to 
God, the infinite good; and that the kinds of goodness that chiefly matter 
ethically are what Adams calls "excellence," and the enjoyment of excel-
lence. Part Il, "Loving the Good", is concerned with God's love for us 
(Chapter 6 is called "Grace"), with our love for God (Chapters 7 and 8 are 
called "Devotion" and "Idolatry"), and with the mutual love of God and 
creature (Chapter 5 is called "Eros"). Part Ill, "The Good and the Right," 
argues for a view of obligation that intrinsically relates it to the guilt that 
fractured relationships cause. On the basis of this view Adams states a 
divine command theory of obligation which, importantly, does not presup-
pose a divine command theory of the nature of the good. In what I thought 
was the best chapter in the book, Adams then addresses a celebrated diffi-
culty for the divine command theory of ethics: this is the chapter 
"Abraham's Dilemma." This is followed by another outstanding chapter, 
on the notion of "Vocation," and by a chapter arguing that legitimate polit-
ical deliberation in a liberal democracy can and should presuppose "con-
siderations of excellence" (p.320). Part IV of the book, "The Epistemology 
of Value," discusses revelation and "moral faith". 
Almost every page of Adams' text has something worth discussing; and 
there are 386 of them. In this review I shall focus, with unavoidable selec-
tiveness, on what I shall call Adams' Platonism. 
What is it to be a Platonist? The term is highly, indeed notoriously, flexi-
ble. In Adams' case "Platonism" means partly an affection for, and interest 
in, the Platonic texts themselves, with the famous speech of Diotima in the 
Symposiulll perhaps occupying the central place in his reading of Plato. 
Adams' Platonism also involves his adoption of a number of interesting 
and controversial theses. I shall discuss three. 
First thesis: The sort of goodness that has primary moral importance is 
excellence. "Excellence" seems to be intended roughly to capture what Plato 
meant by to kalon : 
The [ethical] theory developed here ... gives a primary place [not to 
well-being or welfare, but] to excellence- the type of goodness exem-
plified by the beauty of a sunset, a painting, or a mathematical proof, 
or by the greatness of a novel, the nobility of an unselfish deed, or the 
quality of an athletic or a philosophical performance. It is the good-
ness of that which is worthy of love or admiration, honour or wor-
ship, rather than the good (for herself) that is possessed by one who 
is fortunate or happy ... Excellence is obviously an important topic for 
theism, inasmuch as a god must be worthy of worship, and it lies 
equally at the heart of Platonic conceptions of the good (p. 83). 
This striking and (I think) potentially very fruitful proposal of Adams' is 
likely to meet with opposition from those who take welfare, or human 
well-being, or utility, or pleasure-and-avoidance-of-pain to be of primary 
moral importance. It will seem to them that Adams must think that what's 
good about e.g. feeding the starving is not that they're starving, but that 
feeding the starving is noble, and therefore excellent. But this, welfarists 
will say, radically mislocates the importance of feeding the starving. It also 
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suggests a kind of moral complacency or smugness in the famine-reliever, 
a bit like the "reflexive deformation" found in the (apocryphal?) 
Aristotelian who does great-souled acts because those acts are great-souled. 
(Perhaps it even suggests the Nietzschean thought that, if you can't feed 
the starving with style, then it's not worth doing at all.) 
Adams would meet this charge with two different sorts of response. 
First, in defence of his own ground, he would say that feeding the starving 
displays concern for other individual humans: such concern is, itself and 
intrinsically, of the greatest excellence. Second, he would challenge the 
welfarist on her own ground. How does the welfarist define welfare? 
Adams believes that the usual welfarist answers to this are inadequate, and 
that the right answer defines welfare by reference to his own notion of 
excellence: "It is in the enjoyment of excellence that a person's welfare is 
primarily to be sought" (p. 101). 
We might worry whether the first move here is perhaps gaining its 
point by diluting the sense of "excellence"; on the other hand, we clearly do 
reserve the highest admiration for famine-relievers, so Adams' suggestion 
that they display excellence is perfectly feasible. 
The second move is ingenious and plausible. Obviously there is more to 
welfare than a full stomach. Welfarists of the Singer/ Unger variety have 
not always seemed to reflect this plain fact in their schedules of moral pri-
orities, and Adams' thesis that welfare means the enjoyment of excellence 
goes some way- some way- towards explaining why filling stomachs is not 
our only moral priority, and often not even our main one. (Which is not to 
say that dealing with starvation is not very important indeed, and proba-
bly far more important than most complacent westerners like to admit.) 
Second thesis: God is identical with the Good itself: 
If God is the Good itself, then the Good is not an abstract object but a 
concrete (though not a physical) individual. Indeed, it is a person ... the 
Good itself is a person and, indeed, a lover ... if ... there must be a stan-
dard of goodness that actually is unsurpassably good, whether it 
exists or not, and if we are persuaded that it would not be unsurpass-
ably good if it did not exist, we will then have reason to conclude that 
it really exists (pp. 42-44). 
To this thesis 1 am unsympathetic. Or rather, 1 don't know whether 1 am 
sympathetic or unsympathetic, because 1 don't know what the thesis 
means. Adams evidently means that God is identical with the Platonic Form 
"the Good itself" (to auto to kalon). But 1 just don't know what a Platonic 
Form is meant to be. (I write, by the way, as a professional Plato scholar.) 
The problems in making coherent sense of the Platonic Forms are famil-
iar from Plato's dialogue the Parmenides. We can say without incoherence 
that Plato's Forms are universals, the sort of abstract objects that properties 
or (perhaps) numbers are, in themselves and apart from their instances. 
We can say without incoherence that Plato's Forms are paradigms, perfect 
instances of whatever property they are the Forms of. And we can say 
without incoherence that Plato's Forms are standards- criteria whereby to 
judge whether anything has a given property, and to judge the degree to 
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which the thing has that property if it does have it. What we can't do with-
out incoherence is say all three. But unfortunately, that seems to be just 
what Plato wanted to do. 
There are a number of ways to bring out the incoherence of holding that 
the Forms are paradigms and universals and standards. One celebrated 
argument from the Parmenides itself, the Third Man, shows that holding 
that the Forms are paradigms (perfect examples of properties) entails hold-
ing that they participate in universals (by exemplifying those properties)-
and Plato himself says that whatever participates in a given universal can-
not be that universal. (On the Third Man, incidentally, Adams claims (p.28, 
footnote) that his thesis is not vulnerable to it because he is "proposing no 
theory of the nature of universals as such. The claims about the Good 
itself ... are not meant to explain how things resemble each other or have 
properties." I don't think that Adams can escape the difficulties here just 
by keeping quiet.) 
Another way of showing the problem which is closer to Adams' con-
cerns is to think about what it is for a standard, or a paradigm, or a univer-
sal, to exist. The existence conditions of the three could not be less alike. 
Universals exist when there are things (or possible things) that share a 
property: the universal is the property, an abstract object. Paradigms exist 
when some particular thing is a perfect or near-perfect example of some 
property: the paradigm is the thing with the property, a concrete object. 
Finally, a standard exists when there exists a possible and plausible procedure 
for measurement of some alleged property found in things: the standard is 
the procedure, an institutionally-determined abstract object. Presumably 
Adams' claim that lithe Good itself exists" is meant to assert the existence 
of something which is a paradigm of goodness and is the universal good-
ness and is the standard whereby we judge goodness. But if so, then either 
his claim is incoherent, or else it breaks down into three distinct claims, 
utterly different from each other, and none of them (so far as I can see) fit 
to be understood as equivalent to the claim that God exists. 
I am aware that Adams is not the only Christian philosopher to assert 
that God is identical with the Good, or goodness, itself. Most famously, of 
course, Aquinas says the same. 1 think I have some idea what Aquinas 
means by the identification: in line with his doctrine of divine simplicity, 
he means that there is no distinction between properties and essence in 
God; in line with his doctrine of analogy, he means that God is pre-eminent-
ly good- the paradignl of goodness, as we might say in the present context. 
That I understand (I think); but I don't understand what Adams means by 
saying that God is identical with the Good itself. In any case, I don't think 
Adams has any indispensable purposes that are served by saying it; so per-
haps he would do better not to say it. 
I also suspect that Adams would be better off without his third Platonist 
thesis (pp.28-29): 
Third Thesis: "Other things are excellent insofar as they resemble or 
imitate God." 
This time my objection is not that I don't understand. It is that, under-
standing, I am completely unconvinced. Resembling God is not sufficient 
for being excellent or good. There might be a being who was nearly infi-
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nite, nearly omniscient, nearly omnipotent, and wicked. Such a being would 
resemble God much more than I do. But such a being would not be more 
excellent or good than me. He would be less excellent, because he is 
wicked. 
Resembling God is not necessary for being excellent or good, either. 
How like God is a blue whale, or a coral reef? And how much does it mat-
ter to their goodness, how like God they are? My answer to both questions 
is "Not at all." When Adams tells me (p.36) that God only loves things that 
resemble himself, my main reaction is "What a narrow-minded and self-
absorbed God." Adams' resemblance thesis seems to make God do no 
more than repeat himself, or alternatively, and even worse, admire himself. 
Surely God's world- surely God himself- is bigger and more interesting 
than that. Why can't it be that many created things are good because of 
what Iris Murdoch calls their "sheer surprising variety"? Adams allows 
that Francis of Assisi and Mahatma Gandhi "expanded the human reper-
toire" by creating possibilities that no human had seen before (p. 56). Why 
not allow that God too expands his repertoire when he creates, by having 
the generosity of spirit to create good things that are utterly unlike himself? 
Adams' defence of his resemblance thesis is long and ingenious, and no 
doubt he would have answers ready to meet my objections. It still seems to 
me that his ingenuity is misplaced, for at least two reasons. First, because it 
leads Adams into some quite unnecessary absurdities: "excellence in cook-
ing [can] be analysed as resembling God with respect to one's cooking" (p. 
30); "human persons are globally more like God than sheep are" (p. 118). 
Second, because Adams also feels better impulses than the one behind the 
resemblance thesis, and sometimes follows them. Here is a marvellous pas-
sage where he is discussing love of individuals (pp.166-167): 
It is an erroneous prejudice to suppose that the appeal a particular 
good has for us must be explained by our interest in a more general 
good. Commonly, when something appeals to us ... we are reacting to 
a particular case, and the immediate and primary object of our valu-
ing is something individual and particular. We see something beauti-
ful, and we react to it, valuing that particular thing ... Observing birds 
in the spring, I am thrilled by the brilliant orange of a male Baltimore 
oriole. I like the bird for its colour; the beauty of the colour is a reason 
for my liking both the bird and the experience of seeing it. Does that 
mean that I like them because I value that colour more generally? No; 
my response to the particular sighting is much more immediate than 
that... [likewise, Romeo's love for some one of Juliet's character traits] 
is a very particular interest in Juliet, a delighting in her possession of 
that quality, and a desire for a relationship with her and no other, 
rather than for a relationship with whoever best manifests that quali-
ty (pp. 166-167). 
TIlis passage was a revelation to me. It showed me something I hadn't 
worked out for myself, namely that when we love some person, or some 
quality of some person, the object of our love is not the universal of that 
quality, but something like what metaphysicians call a trope. It is a particu-
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larised 'bit' of a universal: this instance of that quality. I enthusiastically 
endorse this suggestion; but I don't see how it can be endorsed by Adams. 
How can the Adams who insists on defending the resemblance thesis 
agree with the Adams who enthuses about one particular Baltimore oriole? 
The resemblance-thesis Adams says that loving things is finding them 
excellent; that finding them excellent is seeing how they resemble God; and 
that God is the Good itself, the Platonic Form of goodness. Since Platonic 
Forms are universals, nothing could be less particular or more general than 
the Good itself. So the resemblance-thesis Adams is committed precisely to 
the "erroneous prejudice" that the Baltimore-oriole Adams rejects: the 
view that "the appeal a particular good has for us must be explained by 
our interest in a more general good." 
I think Adams is at his best when he implicitly contradicts the 
resemblance thesis. I think that he should go further, and explicitly contra-
dict it. In my view it is a deep mistake for a Christian understanding of the 
nature of goodness to insist on seeing all goodness as God-like. A deep 
mistake, because- whether we are contemplating or studying nuclear 
physics, the Eroica Symphony, or each other- it is essential to the intellect's 
quest for truthfulness that we should have the courage to let the things that 
we contemplate be what they are, without imposing on them the pressure to 
be something else- images of God, or whatever. 
A good example of the attitude I am opposing here is this, from a recent 
essay on being a Christian academic: "in the life of the mind and the explo-
rations of the intellect, we reach beyond the human and begin to appreci-
ate, albeit dimly, the mind that made the world." So physics, chemistry, 
geology, economics, philosophy- these studies are all theology in disguise? 
Nonsense: chemistry is chemistry, and deserves contemplation and study in 
its own right, and not merely as some circuitous detour back to God. 
It is not that there is one kind of goodness, which is likeness to God. It is 
rather that there are indefinitely many kinds of goodness, and it is God-like in 
us to see and apprehend that irreducible variety, and to have the intellectu-
al security to accept it: to accept what Louis MacNeice calls "the drunken-
ness of things being various," without seeking to squash all the different 
kinds of goodness that God's world offers into the single constricting 
mould of resemblance to God. In the words of Gerard Manley Hopkins, in 
two different sonnets ("As kingfishers catch fire" and "Dappled beauty"): 
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells: 
Selves- goes itself; myselfit speaks and spells, 
Crying What I do is me: for that I came. 
All things counter, original, spare, strange: 
Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?) 
With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim; 
He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change: 
Praise him. 
